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I. INTRODUCTION
Asia's telecommunications market has long been viewed as lucrative
and fast growing. The value of the Asian market is estimated at $180
billion, while a recent study shows that the "Asia-Pacific excluding Japan
has been the fastest growing information and communications technology
market, moving at a compound rate of over 14.5%."' Given this rapid
growth and potential, foreign investors (particularly major global
communications operators) have shown strong interest in investing in the
region's telecommunications infrastructure upgrades.
At the same time, telecommunications authorities and governments
have been moving away from the traditional monopoly model of regulation
and separating and privatizing their telecommunications operators. A
worldwide trend to introduce competition to the telecommunications
sector-often beginning with the wireless telephone market-has
continued the liberalization movement, particularly in developed
economies. Competition brought new investment in infrastructure, lower
rates, and innovation to the market. As the benefits of a competitive
telecommunications market become apparent, many Asian governments
also recognize that global corporations require, and in fact demand, state-
of-the-art telecommunications infrastructure. They realize that priorities
must be placed on telecommunications infrastructure projects in order to
attract new business and development to their countries. Finally, in the last
five years, the stunning emergence of the Internet and its potential to
promote global electronic commerce caused governments and
telecommunications authorities to place a higher priority on promoting and
studying information infrastructure issues, so that their countries will not
be relegated to the category of information "have nots."
After several years of strong growth, however, the severe economic
crisis that affected all industry segments in Asia caused investors to pause
and reevaluate the risks involved in financing infrastructure projects. The
Asian economic crisis stalled projects in every industry segment.
Beginning in 1998, the crisis resulted in a hold on numerous
telecommunications projects, especially in countries such as Indonesia,
2Thailand, and Malaysia. Thailand and Indonesia postponed privatizations
1. Asia Telecoms This Month, TELECOM AsIA, Dec. 1998, at 31.
2. See, e.g., More Projects Fall as Telecom Firms Sit out Financial Storm, AsIAN
PACIFIC TELECOMM. ANALYST, Feb. 16, 1998, at 7; Steve Watkins, Thai Firm Tries to Raise
L-Star from Fiscal Ashes, SPACE NEWS, June 29, 1998, at 3.
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of state-owned incumbent telecommunications providers
One positive result of the capital crisis is that it prompted some
countries to open their telecommunications markets to increase foreign
investment.4 For example, in 1998, Malaysia reformed its laws to allow
foreign investors to own up to 61% of a local telephone company.5 During
the World Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecommunications
Agreement negotiations, Korea also submitted that it would raise the
ceiling on foreign ownership from 33% to 49% by 2001.6 In an effort to
jumpstart this process, the government recently raised the ceiling to 49%
effective July 1, 1999.
7
The WTO Basic Telecommunications Agreement-signed by sixty-
nine nations in February 1997-also helped to push forward liberalization
schedules that were underway. In Singapore, the termination of Singapore
Telecom's monopoly on wireline services moved from 2007 to 2000.9 In
Korea, a third international operator was added. 0 In Thailand, the
government committed to initiate liberalization in three years instead of
ten."
The greatest effect of the WTO Agreement, however, is expected to
come from the adoption of regulatory principles binding certain signatories
to rules on anticompetitive practices, interconnection, universal service, the
public availability of licensing criteria, and other issues. 12 The adoption of
these regulatory principles is very significant to foreign investors for two
reasons. First, a stable regulatory environment provides investors with a
secure investment climate. Second, as discussed below, certain regulatory
3. See Pongpen Sutharoj, Continued Stall on Privatisation Damaging Thai
Competitiveness, NATION, Aug. 4, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, WLDSRC File;
Indonesia Economy: Telecoms Dispute Delays Privatisation, EIU VIEWswIRE, Aug. 7,
1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, EIU VW File.
4. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, TELECOM ASIA, Dec. 1998, at 92, 97
[hereinafter The State of Asia's Telecom Health].
5. See id. at 92.
6. See id. at 97; General Trends in Telecommunication Reform 1998: Asia Pacific
Volume V, ITU, compiled in GENERAL TRENDS IN TELECOMMUNICATION REFORM 1998:
WORLD REPORT, at 95 box5.2 (1998) [hereinafter ITU Paper].
7. See Korea's National Assembly OKs Bill to Raise Ownership Ceiling for Facilities-
based Carriers to 49% (visited Aug. 26, 1998) <http:llwww.investgate.com/homel/frame3/
news/teletext.htm>.
8. The results of the WTO Basic Telecommunications Services April 30, 1996,
negotiations are incorporated into the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) by
the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, 36 I.L.M. 366 (1997).
9. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 95 box5.2.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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safeguards enhance and protect competitive conditions. 3
The financing of any project, including a telecommunications project,
involves various risks, including currency risk, political risk, technological
risk, and regulatory risk. This Article focuses on regulatory risk. It first
provides one perspective on the regulatory issues that should be considered
when assessing the investment opportunities in Asian countries. The
Article then provides country-specific analyses of countries with more
developed, and, therefore, more "investor friendly" regulatory schemes.
Furthermore, this Article addresses those countries with less developed, but
potentially favorable regulatory schemes based on the regulatory principles
previously identified.
II. REGULATORY CONSIDERATIONS FOR INVESTMENT
PURPOSES
From a regulatory perspective, potential investors should assess two
aspects of a country's regulatory regime in order to determine whether the
regulatory environment would be favorable toward investments in
telecommunications projects. First, most countries have in place
restrictions on foreign ownership and investment in telecommunications
companies. The extent to which a foreign investor is allowed to participate
in telecommunications projects often is determined by these foreign
ownership limits. Second, a stable, transparent, and competitive regulatory
atmosphere with an effective, independent regulatory agency is necessary
to protect the investment and minimize undue political risks.
A. Foreign Participation Restrictions
Governments often use a variety of mechanisms to restrict foreign
participation in the telecommunications market. These mechanisms must
be analyzed on a case-by-case basis in order to determine the nature and
level of investment allowed in a particular country.
Typically, foreign investment is capped with a foreign investment
ceiling, which may vary according to type of telecommunications service
or type of investment.14 For example, a country's laws may allow direct
foreign investment in a licensee up to twenty-five percent in its wireline
carriers and up to one hundred percent in wireless carriers. It may allow a
higher amount of foreign investment in a holding company that owns a
subsidiary that is a licensee, on the theory that the structure of the holding
13. See id.
14. For example, the United States imposes a 20% foreign ownership limit on direct
investments in telecommunications companies and a 25% foreign ownership limit on
indirect investments in telecommunications companies. See 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1994).
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company dilutes the impact of the foreign investor's control over the
licensee. Alternatively, foreign investment may be allowed through other
legal mechanisms, such as joint ventures, business cooperation contracts
(BCCs), build-transfer arrangements (BTs), and memoranda of
understanding (MOUs).15 These legal mechanisms should be studied
carefully so that a participant fully understands the extent and nature of its
role in the project.
One of the more controversial investment vehicles used in Asia was
China's "Chinese-Chinese-Foreign" (CCF) approach.16 The CCF approach
was developed to "circumvent China's long-standing prohibition on
foreign ownership, operation[,] and management of telecoms enterprises."'7
Using a CCF approach, a "Chinese company licensed to operate a network
... creates a joint venture that serves as an investment clearing house.
Complex [three]-way management contracts between the operator
(Chinese), the joint venture company (Chinese), and the investor (Foreign)
combine equipment leasing, royalties, consulting[,] and license fees in a
network supply contract in lieu of direct equity investment.' i. When it was
first introduced, the CCF approach seemed to signal a new willingness of
the Chinese government to open one of the world's largest
telecommunications markets. Last year, the Chinese government officially
banned CCFs, and earlier this year, Unicom, the state-owned company
which had employed CCF arrangements, "froze [sixteen] million [dollars]
in revenue to be paid to foreign CCF participants and began buying them
out."'" CCF participants now have until the end of August to back out of
the joint venture contracts or they risk receiving nothing in return.20 These
actions are the result of the Chinese government's decision to list Unicorn
shares in Hong Kong and overseas exchanges as a means of obtaining
foreign investment. The decision to use financial investors and remove
strategic investors is seen by some to be a move backwards that ultimately
lessens foreign involvement in China's telecommunications industry.2
Notably, Asian govermnents traditionally have kept a tight hold on
foreign investment in telecommunications. The WTO negotiations reflect
15. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 83, 85.
16. Ken Zita, Will China Embrace Competition? Foreign Equity in Telecoms Hangs in
the Balance (visited Aug. 26, 1999) <http://www.ptc.org/planetptc/ZitaKen/ paper.htm>.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Gordon G. Chang, Unicorn Highlights Reform Paradox, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 26, 1999, at 12.
20. See Wang Xiangwei, China Unicorn Gives CCF Investors August Quit Deadline, S.
CHINA MONING POST, July 26, 1999, at 1.
21. See Chang, supra note 19, at 12.
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this trend. Pursuant to these negotiations, most Asian countries continued
to retain lower caps on foreign ownership of local telecommunications
22
companies than other regions of the world. Although governments have
encouraged joint ventures between local and foreign firms, the level of
foreign investment and equity stakes in such ventures also have been
limited. Only a few governments, such as Hong Kong, Australia, and New
Zealand, have established liberal ownership reforms that encourage foreign
ownership.23
B. Regulatory Safeguards
Regardless of the size or type of investment established, in order to
protect that investment, a stable, transparent, and competitive regulatory
regime with an effective, independent regulator must be in place.
1. Stable and Transparent Environment with an Independent
Regulator
A stable and transparent regulatory atmosphere minimizes the
political risk that additional unforeseen restrictions will be imposed may
impede private investment or favor one competitor over another. Since
impartial decision making is necessary to effectuate competition and
ensure that incumbent operators are not unfairly advantaged, an
independent regulatory agency constitutes the first step toward ensuring a
stable regulatory environment. Ideally, the regulator is fully separated from
the operator, and rules are established that prohibit any conflicts of interest
between the regulated entity and the regulator.
Transparent regulation also is necessary to provide investors with
accurate information and the necessary lead time required to make
reasoned investment decisions. Regulations should be promulgated through
open proceedings and via established procedures. Such safeguards ensure
that investors have the opportunity to assess the shifts in regulatory policies
that may affect their investments.
Finally, an effective regulator should be politically strong and have
enforcement authority.25 That is, the regulator must have the decision-
making authority to establish and implement its policies. Absent such
"teeth," a regulator will be reduced to a mere figurehead.
22. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 86 tbl.5.4.
23. See id.
24. For example, the regulator should be prohibited from owning stock in any
telecommunications company and may not receive anything but limited nominal gifts.
25. Enforcement authority should include the ability to strip a licensee of its operating
authority, to assess monetary fines, and to impose criminal sanctions.
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Of the sixteen Asia-Pacific countries that signed the WTO
Agreement, eleven adhered in part or in full to the regulatory Reference
Paper that requires the regulator to be "separate from, and not accountable
to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services. 26 Of these eleven,
several countries, such as Indonesia and Thailand, do not yet have
independent regulators.27
The positive news for investors is that the trend of establishing
separate regulatory agencies has been growing. The Philippines set up the
first separate regulator in Asia in 1979. A decade later, Asia's regulators
only increased to three. By 1997, however, eleven separate regulators had
been established in the region.2 Although this trend is encouraging, the
road to establishing an effective independent regulator is often long and
time-consuming due to sensitive political and legal considerations. For
instance, India released plans for a telecommunications regulator in 1994,
but the regulator did not become operational until 1997. Similar delays
plague Thailand.29 Hence, even if a country has set forth plans to establish
an independent regulatory body, investors should continue to monitor the
planned and actual implementation time frame.
2. Competitive Environment
Asia is becoming one of the most competitive regions in the world, in
terms of numbers of operators for certain services, such as wireless
services. The introduction of competition into basic services-for example,
local or long-distance telephone service-however, is at an earlier stage
and moving at a slower pace. To date, more than sixty percent of Asian
countries have yet to introduce competition into the local or long-distance
telecommunications service markets. 0 Where countries have allowed
competition in basic services, they have taken a cautious approach and
26. Reference Paper, Apr. 30, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 367, 369 (1997). The Reference Paper
contains principles relating to competition safeguards, interconnection, universal service,
transparency of licensing criteria, independence of the regulator, and allocation of scarce
resources. The United States and 54 other countries assumed the additional specific
commitments set forth in the Reference Paper. The WTO Secretariat distributed the
Reference Paper, but never formally issued it as a WTO document. The text has been
published in 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997). See Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the
U.S. Telecommunications Market, Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated
Entities, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 23891, para. 340
n.692, 10 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 750 (1997).
27. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 80, 84-85 tbl.5.3.
28. See id. at 81-82 tbl.5.2.
29. See infra Part ml.B.3.
30. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 89 fig.5.2.
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allowed limited competition, often in phases."
The introduction of competition has provided many more investment
opportunities in Asia. In order for those opportunities to be fully realized,
however, a competitive and fair regulatory environment must be in place.
As Asian markets move to multioperator regimes, regulators will be faced
with a variety of regulatory issues that are crucial to encouraging and
maintaining competition. Some of the most significant and complex
regulatory issues include interconnection, universal service, and the
licensing process.
Clear policies regarding interconnection are necessary to ensure that
new market entrants are able to obtain access to customers of the
incumbent networks. Interconnection payments represent one of the most
significant costs for new entrants, which significantly affects the earnings
growth of new operators.32 The technical conditions of interconnection also
affect a new operator's business plan and operational success. The new
entrant must be able to provide quality service to its customers in a timely
manner. Thus, both the prices charged for interconnection and the technical
conditions of interconnection must be established as competition is
introduced if a competitive environment is to succeed.33
Universal service policies promote access to basic
telecommunications services by all citizens in a country. Regulations
involving universal service are intended to ensure that reasonably priced
basic telecommunications services are provided to remote areas and high
cost areas, as well as to businesses and urban customers. Many Asian
countries have adopted universal service policies, adopting various
methods of implementation. Some governments require carriers to
construct local lines and develop a variety of additional services as a
condition of licensing. Others require service providers to contribute a
percentage of revenues toward universal service obligations, which are
34then carried out by the incumbent. Any method employed in a
competitive or emerging competitive environment must be structured in a
competitively neutral way-they must not unduly burden one carrier or
industry segment. In order to avoid hidden costs that may affect investment
decisions, payments must be transparent and explicit.
A transparent licensing process is another important regulatory factor
for investors to consider. An established, open-licensing process and a
clearly articulated spectrum plan provides licensees and investors some
31. See id. at 89.
32. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 88 tbl.5.5, § 5.6.1, at 91.
33. See id. § 5.6.1.
34. See id. § 5.6.2.
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assurance of regulatory stability for the term of the license. Multiservice
and technology-neutral licenses also provide greater flexibility to upgrade
technologies more efficiently and to develop new services as markets
develop.35
Il. COUNTRY STUDIES
The development of telecommunications markets across Asia varies
greatly. Generally, in more developed areas, such as Australia, Hong Kong,
Japan, and Singapore, efforts are being focused on enhancing infrastructure
and providing greater diversity in services. In contrast, in the less
developed and developing areas, such as China, Indonesia, and the
Philippines, the focus is on providing basic service and sufficient lines.36
Similarly, the regulatory regimes of such countries tend to vary according
to the extent of the market's development.
Using the principles discussed above-namely, foreign ownership
restrictions and safeguards that ensure a stable, transparent, and
competitive regulatory environment-this Article analyzes various
countries in both categories of more developed and developing countries in
terms of regulatory schemes.
A. Developed Regulatory Schemes
1. Hong Kong
With an estimated annual telecommunications market valued at five
billion dollars, Hong Kong has the sixth largest telecommunications market
in the Asia region.37 The potential business opportunities in Hong Kong,
combined with an established regulatory body, partial competition, and no
foreign ownership restrictions, present a favorable environment for
investment.
The independent regulator in charge of telecommunications, the
Office of the Telecommunication Authority (OFrA), was created in 1993 .
OFrA is in charge of a large variety of tasks, including the licensing of
operators and the management of radio spectrum.39 OFrA also resolves
interconnection disputes, ensures compliance with international
agreements, watches over the protection of consumer interests, and
35. See id. § 5.6.3.
36. Seeid. at78 tbl.5.1.
37. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 73.
38. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 81 tbl.5.2.
39. See id.
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promulgates technical standards. 40 Although OFTA has in the past been
accused of regulating "with a light hand," and failing to take firm,
proactive measures to prevent anticompetitive conduct by the former
monopoly providers, recent measures taken by OFTA have dispelled some
4'
of these concerns.
As of 1997, the Hong Kong government allowed multiple operators
for local services, leased-line service, data, mobile cellular, and paging, but
it maintained a monopoly in international, long-distance, telex, cable
television, and fixed satellite. 42 The Hong Kong telecommunications
market is dominated by four fixed-line carriers, one of which is the former
monopolist, Hongkong Telecom. Hongkong Telecom still has the largest
share of the residential market, but its monopoly on international calls
terminated at the end of 1998.4' There is also a highly competitive Internet-
access market with a one hundred percent growth rate.44 On May 5, 1999,
the government announced that it would not grant any additional fixed
network service licenses until January 1, 2003. 4' This moratorium is
intended to provide the existing carriers time to deploy their networks. In
the meantime, in order to stimulate competition in the local fixed market,
the government also announced that it would issue licenses to companies
deploying nonwireline networks.46
OFTA established necessary regulations to accompany a competitive
environment. Although interconnection policies in Hong Kong generally
lag behind the introduction of competition, interconnection policies
currently exist. New competitors complain, however, that interconnection
negotiations are slow. Service providers are encouraged to conduct
40. See id.
41. Hong Kong Telecomms. (Pacific) Ltd., Application for Authority Pursuant to
Section 214 of the Comms. Act of 1934, as Amended to Resell Int'l Private Lines for the
Provision of Non-telephonic [sic] Serv. between the United States and Hong Kong, Order
and Authorization, 13 F.C.C.R. 20050, para. 37, 14 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 50 (1998)
[hereinafter HKT Order]; see also OFTA, Telecommunications Authority Takes Regulatory
Action against Anti-Competitive [sic] Practices of Hong Kong Telecom (visited Aug. 26,
1999) <http:llwww.ofta.gov.hklpress/pr98.html#fm29> (imposing the maximum statutory
penalty on HKT for anticompetitive marketing practices); OFTA, Determination under
Section 36A of the Telecommunication Ordinance for Interconnection Between Hong Kong
Telephone Company Limited and New T&T Hong Kong Limited, Statement of the
Telecommunications Authority (visited Sept. 1, 1999) <http://www.ofta.gov.hk/
tas/interconnect/ta980821.html> (setting interconnection rates retroactive to 1995).
42. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 90 tbl.5.6.
43. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 81.
44. See id.
45. See Angela Yeung, Telecomm Projects (visited Aug. 30, 1999) <http://www.ptc.
org/resources/industrynews/199924mayc.html>.
46. See id.
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bilateral negotiations over the terms and conditions of interconnection,
with the proviso that the regulator will step in to assist where parties cannot
agree.47 OFTA takes an "objective cost-based approach" toward setting
interconnection charges and requires that the incumbent and former
monopoly provider interconnect "at charges which are based on reasonable
relevant costs. '4 On May 12, 1999, the government introduced a new bill
to the Legislative Council that intends to enhance competition and improve
interconnection and access arrangements. 49 Hong Kong also has adopted a
distributed approach to universal service obligations by requiring service
providers to pay a percentage of revenues to the incumbent carrier for its
universal service expenses.5 The licensing process in Hong Kong is
sufficiently flexible in that licenses are technology neutral."' Finally,
certain regulations also promote competition. For instance, in order to
avoid predatory pricing, the incumbent operator must separate its services
and ensure that there will be no cross-subsidization. 2 In general, Hong
Kong represents a positive environment for investment.
2. Singapore
Singapore's telecommunications market has an estimated annual
value of $2.5 billion and ranks among the top ten largest markets in Asia.53
Singapore is anxious to be the Asia region's telecommunications center for
international business and was noted as working toward turning the country
into an "intelligent island" by 2002.54 Although privately-owned
monopolies over some services exist today, Singapore established a fairly
aggressive schedule for opening those markets over the next five years.
Moreover, Singapore already established some regulations that promote
and protect a competitive environment.
The independent regulator for Singapore, known as the
47. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.1.
48. HKT Order, supra note 41, at para. 26.
49. See Hong Kong Focus: Will Broadband Succeed in Hong Kong?, ASIA COMPUTER
WKLY, Aug. 2, 1999.
50. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.2, at 93.
51. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.3, at 94.
52. For example, the license requirements of Hong Kong Telecom International (HKTI)
require it to implement accounting practices to prevent cross-subsidization and give OFTA
the authority to audit HKTI's accounts. Furthermore, Hong Kong Telecom companies must
comply with OFTA's cost allocations manual, submit regular reports, and are subject to an
annual independent audit. See HKT Order, supra note 41, at para. 31.
53. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 73.
54. Singapore Data Communications Equipment Market, INDUSTRY SECTOR ANALYSIS,
June 15, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, AIW File; see The State of Asia's
Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 97.
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Telecommunication Authority of Singapore (TAS), was established in
1992.55 TAS is responsible for licensing, enforcement of regulations,
management of radio spectrum, and the promotion of a fair and
competitive operating environment, including dispute resolution. The
agency also ensures compliance with international agreements, controls
tariffs and prices, sets principles for interconnection and access charges,
and monitors service quality and customer complaints. Finally, the
development of technical standards, technology selection, and equipment
approval also fall within the agency's authority. 6 The government recently
announced a new convergence-oriented ministry, known as the Ministry of
Information and Communication Technology. This agency will govern the
Internet services industry. Along those lines, the government announced
that it would issue unlimited licenses to companies providing Internet
57
exchange services.
Foreign ownership of facilities-based services is limited to forty-nine
percent.58 Although monopolies over fixed-line services currently are in
place, Singapore allowed partial competition for data and leased lines and
full competition for mobile cellular, paging, and cable TV is now in place.59
Currently, Singapore Telecom (SingTel) is the monopoly provider of basic
telephone services, both domestic and international. 60 In 1998, one
additional license for basic telecommunications services was granted to
StarHub, a consortium of British Telecom, NTT, and local Singapore
61partners. StarHub will begin operating in April 2000. StarHub recently
finalized its interconnection agreement with SingTel to lay the foundation
62for providing a competitive service. TAS also announced plans to offer
additional basic telecommunications licenses to take effect in 2002.63
Opportunities to provide international services will be the main focus for
most new participants, since Singapore's domestic services are considered
to be unusually efficient due to the small size of the country.64 In the area
of wireless communications, SingTel lost its monopoly over cellular and
55. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 82 tbl.5.2.
56. See id.
57. See Southeast Asia Lures ISPs, TECHWEB NEwS, June 24, 1999, available in
LEXIS, News Library, TECHWB File.
58. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 85 tbl.5.3.
59. See id. at 90 tbl.5.6.
60. See id. at 88-89, 90 tbl.5.6.
61. See Telecommunications Authority of Singapore, Interconnect Agreement Signed
by SingTel and StarHub (visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://www.tas.gov.sg/website/
home.nsf/html/indexNewsroom>; The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 96.
62. See Interconnect Agreement Signed by SingTel and StarHub, supra note 61.
63. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 96.
64. See id.
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paging services in 1997. 65 Since then, three mobile licenses and three
paging licenses have been granted to private parties.66 Finally, Singapore
allowed the resale of international and domestic public switched services. 67
Singapore was one of the first Asian countries to consider competitive
regulatory issues, such as those governing interconnection and the
introduction of multiple operators contemporaneously. TAS promulgated
interconnection guidelines and the basis for interconnection charges at the68
same time that it started the licensing process. Interconnection rates are
determined by the regulator, at least for the first three years after the
market entry of a new fixed-line provider. 69 After that, TAS will observe
and try to facilitate negotiations between the parties.70 The interconnection
charges are based on forward-looking economic cost and long-run average
incremental cost.7 1 Competition is also promoted in that the dominant
carrier is required to separate its services in order to prevent cross-
subsidization.72 Thus, Singapore represents a stable environment for
investment.
C. Developing Regulatory Schemes
1. China
China's $17.4 billion annual telecommunications market continues to
spark investors' interest, given that it is the largest valued market in Asia.73
China's closed regulatory scheme, however, has made it nearly impossible
for foreigners to participate in telecommunications infrastructure projects.
Recent events provide some indications that China's regulatory regime
may become more favorable for entry and foreign investment in the future.
None of the basic principles that provide indicators of a favorable
regulatory environment for investment are currently present in the China
telecommunications market. First, the regulator for telecommunications
services, the newly formed Ministry of Information Industry (MII), is not
an independent regulator in that MII also is the largest national and
international operator of telecommunications services and owns the three
65. See Singapore Data Communications Equipment Market, supra note 54.
66. See id.
67. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 97.
68. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.1.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See id. § 5.6.4, at 96.
73. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 73.
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largest mobile operators in the country.74 Given this relationship between
the regulator and the incumbent carrier, it would be difficult for the MII to
make policy decisions in an independent and impartial manner.
Partial competition has been introduced in the local, long-distance,
data, and leased-line services, while full competition exists for telex,
mobile cellular, and paging.75 China partially opened the local and long-
distance markets in 1994 when it allowed a second national carrier, Lian
. 76
Tong (Unicom), into the market. The third player that shapes the current
market is the Ji Tong Corporation, which is in charge of the "Three Golden
Projects," an initiative to develop a national information infrastructure.77 In
February 1999, the government further sharpened competition by
establishing the China Cable TV Network Corporation (CCNC), which will
78provide basic and value-added telecommunications services.
Chinese law currently prohibits foreign ownership of
telecommunications operations. As a consequence, foreign companies such
as NEC Corp., AT&T, and Lucent Technologies participated in the China
market through contracts for equipment supplies, or for specific work on
particular infrastructure projects for the MUI. Until recently, firms also have
used the CCF approach.79
Even in its partially competitive markets, China's regulatory
requirements hinder competition. For instance, China has been reluctant to
promulgate sufficiently clear regulations that mandate interconnection.
Hence, China's second network operator Unicom underwent a six to fifteen
month delay before it finally was granted interconnection with the state-
owned, incumbent local network.80 Furthermore, it is reported that official
statements regarding key regulatory policies, such as interconnection, can
be either unclear or cursory, which creates uncertainty and implementation
difficulties.8
Despite the many high regulatory hurdles in the China
telecommunications market, commentators recently indicated that there is a
"new sophistication in the marketplace.,12 The Chinese government is
beginning to realize that development of the telecommunications industry
74. See id. at 78.
75. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 90 tbl.5.6.
76. Unicorn also is a state-owned entity. See id., at 89 n.15.
77. The State ofAsia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 78.
78. See Michael J. Wang, New Telcom Carrier (visited Aug. 27, 1999) <http://
www.ptc.org/resources/industry-news/1999/7junc.html>.
79. See supra Part II.A.
80. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.1.
81. See id. at92.
82. Zita, supra note 16, at 2.
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is vital to the growth of the economy and business sectors. Some noted that
China Unicorn's plan to list in the Hong Kong and overseas stock
exchanges emphasizes the country's determination to strengthen
competition in telecoms.83 However, others indicated that seeking foreign
investment by eliminating the previous CCF structures, which allowed
some foreign strategic participation, indicates a move away from increased
foreign participation.8
2. Malaysia
Malaysia has ambitious plans to develop its telecommunications
market, including the government's objective to close the service
penetration gap between Malaysia and the developed countries by 2006.85
Among the main players in the approximately $2.5 billion market is
Telekom Malaysia, the formerly government-owned and now publicly-
owned operator, as well the privately-owned Cellular Communication
Network, Binariang, Time Telekom, and Mutiara Swisscom.1
6
Malaysia took important steps to make the country attractive for
private and foreign investments. The regulatory body was created in 1950
8,7
and advertises itself as being "a firm regulatory body." Recently, a new
Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission was established
as the sole regulatory body for telecommunications, broadcasting, and
computing." Recognizing the potential of e-commerce, Malaysia also
passed cyber laws relating to digital signature, copyright, computer crimes,
and telemedicine.89 Last year, Malaysia also passed the Communications
and Multimedia Act of 1998, which governs the convergence of the
telecommunications, broadcast, and computer industries.
The laws and regulations of Malaysia allow competition in all major
market segments. In that respect, Malaysia is similar to countries like
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Philippines. Malaysia not only
83. See Matthew Brooker, China Unicorn Wins Listing Nod, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 19, 1999, at 1.
84. See Chang, supra note 19, at 12.
85. See Ministry of Energy, Malaysia's National Telecommunications Policy (visited
Oct. 24, 1999) <http://www.jtm.gov.my/jtm/documents.htm>.
86. See The State ofAsia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 92.
87. Ministry of Energy, Multiple Operator Environment (visited Sept. 16, 1999)
<http:/www.jtm.gov.my/jtmlmutliple.html>.
88. See Moggie: Telekoms Department to Re-deploy [sic] 196 Staff, NEW STRAITS
TIMES (Malaysia), Feb. 16, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, AIW File.
89. See Dionne Jackson-Miller, Technology-G-15: Doing Business in Cyberspace,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, IACNWS File.
90. See Malaysia Can Be Major IT Player, Says Moggie, NEW STRAITS TIMES
(Malaysia), Feb. 23, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, AIW File.
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largely liberalized its markets but also introduced a number of competition
safeguards, such as equal-access rules, to ensure that competitors have an
actual chance of succeeding.9'
Foreign operators should carefully monitor Malaysia's
interconnection policy, which is not yet fully established, but is planned to
include cost-based pricing for interconnection charges. 92 Universal service
obligations also are integrated into license terms. Multiple service
providers are subject to a number of obligations, including the
establishment of local lines. An interesting aspect of Malaysia's licensing
process is its move to issuing full-service licenses, rather than service-
specific licenses, in order to increase investment, especially from investors
who are interested in strategic stakes in operators. 93
Malaysia has only partially adopted the WTO principles. The
government seems to be courting foreign investors, nevertheless, by now
allowing sixty-one percent foreign ownership in local telecommunications
companies. 94 However, that stake must be reduced to forty-nine percent in
five years. 9' Some analysts continue to believe, however, that this is an
excellent time to invest in Malaysia.
96
3. Thailand
Many regulatory changes occurring in Thailand make its estimated
two billion dollars annual telecommunications market another potential
option for investors. Thailand is currently undergoing a privatization of its
two state-owned telecommunications providers. The Telephone
Organization of Thailand (TOT) is Thailand's major telecommunications
services and network provider. The Communications Authority of Thailand
(CAT) provides international as well as cellular service.97 The government
is currently working with the World Bank to establish a privatization
secretariat that will manage the sale of these and other state-owned
enterprises. 9'
Private participation in the telecommunications industry historically
has been allowed through "build-transfer-operate" arrangements." Under
91. See Multiple Operator Environment, supra note 87.
92. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 92.
93. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, § 5.6.3, at 93.
94. See Battling the Odds, MALAYSIA Bus., May 16, 1999, available at 1999 WL
12263646.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 100.
98. See id. at 99.
99. Id. at 100.
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this arrangement, a concession is granted for specific line construction
projects. Ownership of the assets is transferred to the state-owned operator
immediately after construction and the concessionaires then operate the
assets in return for a fixed revenue share.' °° This system is expected to
terminate in fiscal 1999, when the concession contracts will be converted
into joint-venture contracts and the state-owned entity will become a
shareholder in the former concessionaires.'o
Proposed laws and regulations also are being considered as the
government attempts to lay a framework for introducing competition and
foreign investment. A government working group suggested that
infrastructure services, network provision, and value-added services be
licensed for an unlimited number of players starting January 1, 2000.'02
Foreign ownership in each licensee would be limited to twenty percent.
The proposed law would allow foreign entities to hold up to forty-nine
percent of all licensees starting January 1, 2006, and one hundred percent
starting January 2010.103
Thailand also has been moving toward establishing an independent
regulator and adopting regulations to promote competition. Establishment
of an independent regulator has been stalled due to political in-fighting,
however, and the process could be held up until October 2000.'04 Disputes
also have arisen regarding the adoption of a Telecom Act to ensure fair and
efficient competition. 05 In the meantime, however, TOT has been studying
a new tariff structure, which will include a framework for interconnection
charges.' 6 The combined goals of privatization, establishing an
independent regulator and formulating a regulatory framework to
accompany the introduction of a liberalized market, will continue to be
difficult and complex as the government tackles these issues in concert.
4. Korea
Although the economic crisis affected the economic growth rate in
100. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 88 tbl.5.5.
101. See Interconnection-Charges, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 2, 1998, available in LEXIS,
News Library, APINTL File.
102. See Telecom Act Public Hearings Aim to Ensure Fairness, NATION, Feb. 1, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WLDSRC File.
103. See id.
104. See Rifts Mar Regulation Plan for Telecom-Broadcasting, NATION, Jan. 26, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WLDSRC File.
105. See Telecom Act Public Hearings Aim to Ensure Fairness, supra note 102.
106. See TOT to Revamp Tariff Structure, NATION, Oct. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS,
News Library, WLDSRC File; New TOT Chief Warns of Change, NATION, Mar. 14, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, WLDSRC File.
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Korea and, hence, the development of infrastructure, foreign firms continue
to push for the liberalization of the Korean telecommunications market.'07
With an annual telecommunications market valued at $8.7 billion'18 and a
gradual liberalization of its markets, foreign investors continue to monitor
the progress of developments in Korea.
The Ministry of Information and Communication establishes rules
and policies for the telecommunications industry. Furthermore, Korea
adopted the WTO Agreement's regulatory principles and introduced
competition in all sectors through a phased-in approach.' 9 For example, the
government first introduced competition in core basic services in 1991
when it allowed a second international long-distance provider, Dacom, to
compete with Korea Telecom. " In 1996, Dacom also began operating as
the second domestic long-distance provider."' In October 1997, Korea
Global Telecom became the third international long-distance provider.' In
addition, in 1999, Korea Telecom's monopoly on local access is scheduled
to end and the new operator, Hanaro Telecom, will begin service. 13 The
government adopted a more aggressive approach to introducing
competition for mobile services. In that instance, the market went from a
monopoly to a multiple-operator environment with five operators in less
than three years.14
The government carefully controls the introduction of competition,
however, through fairly extensive price control mechanisms. For instance,
when Dacom entered the market as the second domestic long-distance
provider, it was permitted a ten percent price advantage over Korea
Telecom. 15 As it gained market share, however, it was allowed only a one
percent price advantage.1 6 Korea placed similar restrictions on Shinsegi
when it entered the market as the second mobile operator. 1'7
Investors have closely monitored the lifting of Korea's foreign
ownership restrictions. Effective July 1, 1999, the foreign equity ownership
107. See Nam In-Soo, U.S. Demands Complete Opening of Korean Telecommunications
Mart, KOREA HERALD, Dec. 4, 1998, available at 1998 WL 20206500.
108. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 73.
109. See LTU Paper, supra note 6, at 84 tbl.5.3.
110. See id. at 89.
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra note 4, at 97.
114. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 88.
115. See id. at 94.
116. See id.
117. See id.
[Vol. 52
Number 1] TELECOMMUNICATIONS PROJECTS IN ASIA
limit for facilities-based telecom carriers was raised from 33% to 49%.18
This change took place ahead of the scheduled increase in 2001, according
to the concession schedule submitted by Korea to the WTO's Group on
Basic Telecommunications.119  The government is moving toward
liberalization as evidenced by its move earlier this year to sell 13% of
Korea Telecom held shares to foreign investors, increasing the foreign-
owned shares from 5% to 19.1%.120 In general, the developments in Korea
should be closely watched as the opportunities for foreign participation
increase.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the recent Asian economic crisis, the overall picture for Asian
telecommunications infrastructure projects remains promising. Asian
governments continue to liberalize their regulatory schemes, thus reducing
regulatory and political risks to investors. The true test, however, is yet to
come. As nations of the world struggle to establish stable and predictable
legal frameworks for electronic commerce over the Internet, they will
realize that their efforts in the telecommunications arena was merely a
prelude to even more complex and difficult issues involving the
information economy of the next century.
118. See Korea's National Assembly OKs Bill to Raise Foreign Ownership Ceiling for
Facilities-Based Carriers to 49%, supra note 7; The State of Asia's Telecom Health, supra
note 4, at 97.
119. See ITU Paper, supra note 6, at 84 tbl.5.3.
120. See P.S. Kim, Telecom Investment (visited Aug. 30, 1999) <http://www.ptc.org/
resources/industry..news/1999/ljun.html>.

